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Abstract— This work proposes a new and flexible unreliable 
failure detector whose output is related to the trust level of a set 
of processes. By expressing the relevance of each process of the 
set by an impact factor value, our approach allows the tuning of 
the detector output, making possible a softer or stricter 
monitoring.  The idea behind our proposal is that, according to 
an acceptable margin of failures and the impact factor assigned 
to processes, in some scenarios, the failure of some low impact 
processes may not change the user confidence in the set of 
processes, while the crash of a high impact factor process may 
seriously affect it. We outline the application scenarios and the 
proposed unreliable failure detector, giving a detailed account of 
the concept on which it is based. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An unreliable failure detector (FD) is a basic service that 
can enable the development of fault tolerant distributed 
systems [1]. A FD can be seen as an oracle that gives 
information, not always correct, about processes failures [2]. 
The majority of them are based on a binary model, where 
monitored processes are either “trusted” or “suspected”.  
Therefore, many of the existing FD, such as those defined in 
[1] [3], output the set of processes that is currently suspected to 
have crashed. A non binary approach is present in [4], the 
accrual failure detector, which outputs a suspicion level on a 
continuous scale.  
This paper presents a new unreliable failure detector, called 
Impact. The Impact FD outputs a trust level concerning a set 
of monitoring processes. The output can be considered as the 
degree of confidence in this set of processes. To this end, an 
impact factor is assigned to each process of the set. 
Furthermore, a fault margin parameter defines an impact factor 
limit value, below which the confidence degree on the set is 
not affected. Hence, depending on the trust level output, the 
users can decide whether it is reliably operating or if some 
measures may be taken (urgently or not, with regard to the trust 
level output).   
Motivation: The Impact FD can be applied to different 
distributed scenarios and it is flexible enough to meet different 
needs. It is quite suitable for environments where there is node 
redundancy. The following two examples illustrate scenarios 
where the Impact detector can be used. 
A system in the area of healthcare requires the use of 
several sensors to measure different kinds of information about 
the health status of a person, such as, vital signs, location, falls, 
gait patterns, and acceleration. From this perspective, this 
scenario is critical since faults in the components can put the 
patient at serious risk.  For instance, we can consider a scenario 
with four sensors: q1 - body temperature; q2 - pulse; q3 - 
electrocardiogram(ECG); and q4 - galvanic skin as well as an 
intermediate node responsible for collecting information from 
these sensors and taking appropriate action based on the output 
of the Impact FD. In this example, some sensors are not 
considered to be critical, such as the sensor q1 which measures 
the temperature; however, others are extremely critical such as 
q3, the ECG sensor. Therefore, the impact factor assigned to q3 
is higher than q2’s. Furthermore, q2 collects data on the 
heartbeats and q3 on the electrical activity of the heart. 
However, q3 is a type of sensor that also collects data on the 
heartbeats. Hence, since there is redundancy of information, 
i.e., the failure of q2 sensor is not critical enough to make the 
system vulnerable and endanger the life of the monitored 
person. We could, therefore, define a fault margin equals to 
q2’s impact factor. On the other hand, if q3 fails, the confidence 
of the system is compromised. 
A second example concerns Connected Dominating Set 
(CDS), which has been proposed as a virtual backbone of 
wireless ad hoc networks [5].  A dominating set (DS) of a 
graph G = (V, E) is a subset V’  V such that each node in V - 
V’ is adjacent to some node in V’, and a connected dominating 
set (CDS) is a dominating set which also induces a connected 
subgraph. Nodes in V’ are denoted dominator nodes (DN) and 
are the only responsible for relaying messages over the 
network. In such a scenario, we could think that every DN 
monitors the liveness of its neighbor nodes (the monitored set). 
However, since the failure of a DN may seriously affect the 
connectivity of the CDS, DN neighbors should have a higher 
impact factor than the other neighbors. In its turn, the fault 
margin could be set with a value that expresses that the 
connectivity of the network should always be guaranteed.        
II. THE IMPACT UNRELIABLE FAILURE DETECTOR 
The Impact FD can be defined as an unreliable failure 
detector that provides an output related to the trust level with 
regard to a set of processes. If the FD output is under a given 
limit value, defined by the user, the confidence in the set of 
processes is ensured. 
We consider a distributed system that consists of a finite set 
of processes  = {p1,...,pn}. The failure model is based on [1]. 
Failures are only by crash. A process can be correct or faulty, 
i.e., a process is faulty if it has crashed, otherwise it is correct.  
We assume the existence of some global time denoted T. A 
failure pattern is a function F: T  2, where F(t) is the set of 
processes that have failed before or at time t. The function 
correct(F) denotes the set of correct processes, i.e., those that 
never belong to failure pattern (F), while faulty(F) denotes the 
set of faulty processes, i.e., the complement of correct(F) with 
respect to . 
A process p   monitors m processes q (q  S = 
{q1,...,qm} S   ). Each process q  S has a fault impact 
factor (Iq). Process p knows its own identity and those of 
processes in S, as well as the impact factor of the latter. It does 
not necessary know . Furthermore, an acceptable margin of 
failures, denoted fault_marginp
S
, characterizes the degree of 
failure acceptable flexibility of p in relation to S. The value of 
every impact factor (Iq) must be within 0 < Iq ≤  fault_marginp
S
.  
We should point out that both the impact factor and the 
fault_marginp
S
 parameters render the estimation of the 
confidence of S by p more flexible. For instance, it might 
happen that some processes in S are faulty or suspected of 
being faulty and p always trusts S.   
 We define sum(set) as the function that returns the sum of 
the impact factors of all processes in set. Note that for the 
monitoring set S, sum(S) must be at least equal to the 
fault_marginp
S
. We also define a trust limit, such that 
trust_limitp
S
 = sum(S) – fault_marginp
S
.  
 We denote trustedp
S
(t) as the set of processes in S that p 
considers not to be faulty at time t  T. The Impact FD (Ip
S
) 
outputs the trust level of S, which expresses the confidence that 
p has in the set S: 
Definition 1 (trust level): The trust level at t  T of processes p 
 F(t) with respect to the set of processes S is the function 
trust_levelp
S
: T  R, such that trust_levelp
S
 (t) = sum(trustedp
S
 
(t)). 
If trust_levelp
S
(t) > trust_limitp
S
, S is considered  to be 
trusted at t by p, i.e., the confidence of p in S has not been  
affected; otherwise  S is considered not trusted by p at t.  
Fig. 1 shows an example with a set of four processes. The 
impact factor was defined according to the relevance of each 
process of set S. The fault_marginp
S
 is equal to 1. Thus, sum(S) 
and trust_limitp
S
 are respectively equal to 2.6 and 1.6 (sum(S) – 
fault_marginp
S
). In this set, we can observe that process q1 has 
low relevance and q3 is highly relevant. Several situations are 
shown and the set S is considered not trusted when the 
trust_levelp
S
 (t) is smaller than or equal to trust_limitp
S
 . 
The approach of the Impact FD makes possible to carry out 
the monitoring in both softer and stricter way. Furthermore, if 
some properties are defined, some classes of Impact FD can 
also be defined. For instance: 
Prop. 1 (Impact strong completeness p
S
): If p, which monitors 
the set S, is correct, there is a time after which p does not trust 
any crashed process of S. 
t  T, p  correct(F), q  (faulty(F) ∩ S),  
t’ ≥  t, q  trustedp
S
(t’) 
 
Fig. 1. Example of p’s FD output related to S 
Prop. 2 (Eventual impact strong accuracy p
S
): If p, which 
monitors the set S, is correct, there is a time after which correct 
processes of S are never suspected by p. 
t  T, t’ ≥ t, p,  q  (correct(F) ∩ S),  
q  trustedp
S
 (t’) 
Prop. 3 (Eventual set sum accuracy):  
t  T, p  correct(F),  
t’ ≥ t, trust_levelp
S
(t’) = sum(correct(F)∩ S) 
Eventual Perfect Impact FD ( IPp
S
) class: For process p and 
set S, Prop. 1, Prop.  2, and Prop. 3 are satisfied.  
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have presented and defined a new 
unreliable failure detector, called Impact, that provides an 
output related to a set of processes and not just to each one 
individually. We have also described some scenarios suitable 
for the Impact FD. Both the impact factor and the fault margin 
provide a degree of flexible applicability, since they enable the 
user to tune the FD output in accordance with the specific 
needs of the application. They also might weaken the rate of 
false responses when compared to traditional unreliable failure 
detectors.  
In a further step of this research, we intend to define other 
properties of the Impact FD and address failure detector 
reductions from the latter to other well-known detectors.  
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